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Reevaluating Swedish Membership 
in the European Monetary Union
Evidence from an Estimated Model
Ulf Söderström
10.1    Introduction
When the Swedish government negotiated the treaty of accession to the 
European Union in 1993 and 1994, the negotiations did not include an 
exemption to the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
In contrast to Denmark and the United Kingdom, which did obtain such 
exemptions, Sweden is therefore required by EU law to join EMU and adopt 
the euro as soon as the convergence criteria speciﬁ  ed in the Maastricht treaty 
are fulﬁ  lled. Nevertheless, the Swedish Parliament (the Riksdag) decided in 
1997 that Sweden would not join the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 
of the European Monetary System, and the Swedish central bank (Sveri-
ges Riksbank) has followed a policy of inﬂ  ation targeting with a ﬂ  exible 
exchange rate since 1993. As a consequence, in the assessments made by the 
European Commission prior to the launch of EMU in 1999 and every two 
years since 2000, Sweden has been judged not to fulﬁ  ll the criterion regard-
ing exchange rate stability, which requires the member state to participate 
in the ERM (now the ERM II). Sweden, therefore, is a member state with a 
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derogation from the third stage of EMU, but is not exempted from partici-
pation.1 A national referendum on Swedish participation in EMU was held 
in September 2003, and the result was a rejection of membership with 56 
percent of the electorate voting against and 42 percent voting in favor. As 
a consequence, the Riksdag decision of 1997 remains in force, and Sweden 
remains outside EMU.
Ten years after the launch of EMU, I revisit the question of the potential 
costs and beneﬁ  ts for Sweden of joining the monetary union. I ﬁ  rst (in sec-
tion 10.2) return to the report of the Calmfors Commission, the government 
commission assigned to study the consequences of EMU membership in 
1995 and 1996. I summarize the main conclusions of the Commission, and 
provide an updated evaluation of the arguments made in the report. Some of 
these arguments speak more strongly in favor of Swedish EMU membership 
today than in 1996, while others more clearly speak against membership.
I then take a broad look at European business cycles (in section 10.3) and 
discuss the comovement between the Swedish and European economies. I 
show that European business cycles are closely correlated with each other, 
suggesting that business cycles in Europe are largely driven by common 
shocks. Although the large EMU member countries show stronger comove-
ment with the euro area, Sweden tends to be at least as strongly correlated 
with the euro area as some EMU members (for instance, Finland), and more 
closely correlated than Norway and the United Kingdom. This evidence 
indicates that membership in EMU would not be very costly for Sweden, 
and not more so than for some current EMU members.
Next, I present evidence from an estimated model of the Swedish econ-
omy. I discuss in section 10.4 the importance of country-  speciﬁ  c shocks for 
Swedish business cycle ﬂ  uctuations since 1993, and I study the source and 
eﬀects of ﬂ  uctuations in the exchange rate. In contrast to the evidence in 
section 10.3, the estimated model suggests that country-  speciﬁ  c shocks are 
an important source of Swedish business cycle ﬂ  uctuations, and therefore 
that participation in the monetary union may be costly. On the other hand, 
the model interprets most ﬂ  uctuations in the exchange rate as caused by 
shocks to the exchange rate risk premium, rather than endogenous move-
ments that help the economy adjust after disturbances to other sectors in 
the economy. As such risk premium shocks induce ineﬃcient volatility in the 
macroeconomy, the beneﬁ  ts of having a ﬂ  exible exchange rate may be small, 
speaking in favor of EMU membership (which to a large extent would elimi-
nate exchange rate ﬂ  uctuations, as the EMU countries represent around 60 
percent of Swedish trade).
1. The assessments also conclude that Swedish legislation concerning the ﬁ  nancial indepen-
dence of the Riksbank and the Riksbank’s integration into the European System of Central 
Banks (ESCB) is not consistent with the Maastricht treaty and the statutes of the ESCB and 
the European Central Bank (ECB).Reevaluating Swedish Membership in the European Monetary Union    3 8 1
I then (in section 10.5) use the model for a counterfactual experiment to 
evaluate what would have been the consequences for the Swedish economy 
if Sweden had joined EMU in January 1999. The simulations predict that 
Swedish membership in the monetary union might have led to slightly higher 
gross domestic product (GDP) growth and inﬂ  ation, but also higher volatil-
ity in GDP growth. Furthermore, EMU membership might have implied 
higher inﬂ  ation in 2004 and 2005, when inﬂ  ation was exceptionally low in 
Sweden. However, the eﬀects of EMU membership are not dramatic, reﬂ  ect-
ing the strong comovement of the Swedish and euro area economies in the 
last decade.
The model is silent on many relevant issues. I discuss some of these in 
section 10.6; for instance, the impact of EMU on economic integration and 
labor markets, and whether Sweden has lost political inﬂ  uence in the EU 
by not participating in EMU. Finally, I conclude in section 10.7 that, per-
haps unsurprisingly, the evidence presented here is not conclusive about the 
whether the costs or the beneﬁ  ts of Swedish EMU membership dominate. 
These conclusions may, however, be sharpened by the outcome of the cur-
rent ﬁ  nancial crisis.
10.2    The  Calmfors  Commission
Ahead of the Riksdag decision in 1997 concerning Swedish membership 
in EMU, the Swedish government appointed a commission (the “Calm-
fors Commission”) to analyze the consequences of EMU and of Swedish 
membership in the monetary union. The Commission, composed of ﬁ  ve 
economists and three political scientists, was appointed in October 1995 and 
delivered its report in October 1996 (see Calmfors et al. 1996).
The Commission argued that monetary union would lead to small ef-
ﬁ  ciency gains due to reduced transaction costs and exchange rate uncer-
tainty and increased competition, speaking in favor of Swedish membership. 
However, these gains needed to be weighed against the adverse eﬀects of 
large country-  speciﬁ  c disturbances that could have severe consequences if 
they were not counteracted by independent monetary policy and exchange 
rate policy. While these large disturbances normally would not be an impor-
tant problem, the Commission argued that independent monetary policy 
could be an important insurance against such extreme events.
An important argument in favor of Swedish EMU membership was 
deemed to be the potential loss of political inﬂ  uence within the EU if Swe-
den were to stay outside the monetary union.
All in all, the ﬁ  nal assessment of the Commission was that the economic 
arguments did not favor participation, while the political arguments were in 
support of membership, but that the arguments against membership in 1999 
were stronger than those in favor. Therefore, the Commission concluded that 382    Ulf  Söderström
while Sweden should aim at future membership in the monetary union, it 
would be better not to join EMU in the ﬁ  rst wave of 1999.2
The Commission listed four main reasons for its conclusion:
1. The EMU membership would be risky with the then-  high level of 
unemployment, as the economy would be particularly vulnerable to adverse 
shocks. After a long period with an unemployment rate around 2 to 3 per-
cent, the Swedish unemployment rate had increased quickly to above 9 per-
cent during the recession in 1992 and 1993, and remained at this level until 
the late 1990s. (See also ﬁ  gure 10.3.)
2.  The already precarious ﬁ  scal situation also made membership risky, as 
ﬁ  scal measures would need to carry a larger burden of stabilization policy 
within the monetary union, and a deterioration of the government ﬁ  nances 
would need to be followed by drastic countermeasures to satisfy the rules of 
the Stability and Growth Pact. The ratio of government debt to GDP was 
close to 75 percent in 1995 and 1996, and the government deﬁ  cit amounted 
to 9 percent and 7 percent of GDP in 1994 and 1995, respectively. Again, 
this diﬃcult ﬁ  scal situation was partly caused by the recession in the early 
1990s.
3.  To ensure legitimacy among the electorate, the commission saw a need 
for a broad public debate concerning the monetary union before a deﬁ  nitive 
decision was taken. There had not been any extensive debate of EMU before 
the referendum concerning EU membership in 1994, as EMU membership 
was seen as an issue separate from EU membership.
4. The fact that only a subset of EU members were likely to join the 
monetary union, and, in particular, not Denmark and the United Kingdom, 
implied that the potential economic gains of membership seemed small, 
while the costs of staying outside in terms of lost political inﬂ  uence seemed 
limited. In 1996, many observers expected that only a small core of EU 
member states (consisting of Germany, France, the Benelux countries, Aus-
tria, and perhaps Finland and Ireland) would be able to qualify for EMU 
membership.
The Commission stressed that its assessment of membership would be 
positively aﬀected if unemployment were to fall and the ﬁ  scal situation 
stabilized. At the same time, the Commission feared that staying outside 
EMU might lead to a loss of credibility for the Swedish currency, leading 
to increased short-  term interest rates and a continued large spread between 
Swedish and EMU long-  term interest rates.
When revisiting the issues more than ten years later, some arguments 
seem to speak more strongly in favor of Swedish membership in EMU, 
2. One member of the Commission dissented from this conclusion, arguing that the costs of 
monetary union would be large also in the longer term, and that Sweden should not join the 
monetary union in the future. See Reservation (statement of dissenting opinion) by Gottfries 
in Calmfors et al. (1996).Reevaluating Swedish Membership in the European Monetary Union    3 8 3
while other arguments speak more strongly against. First, the EMU project 
must be deemed as a great success. More countries than expected joined in 
1999, and although Denmark is not an EMU member, it maintains a ﬁ  xed-
 exchange rate against the euro, and its monetary policy shadows that of the 
European Central Bank (ECB). The ECB has established credibility for a 
low inﬂ  ation policy, and the euro has become a major currency, probably 
more important than the individual currencies taken together. The gains in 
terms of economic integration also seem fairly large, perhaps larger than 
expected in 1996 (see section 10.6). Second, since 1996, unemployment has 
fallen considerably in Sweden (to around 6 percent in September 2008), and 
the ﬁ  scal situation has been stabilized (government debt in 2007 was around 
40 percent of GDP and the government ran a surplus of around 3.5 percent 
of GDP). Thus, Sweden today seems less vulnerable to adverse shocks than 
in 1996. Finally, there do not seem to have been any large country-  speciﬁ  c 
disturbances to the Swedish economy, so the gains from independent mon-
etary policy may have been small. While the last point is not particularly 
strong, as independent monetary policy may turn out to be of crucial impor-
tance in the future, the other arguments suggest that the case for EMU 
membership may be stronger today than in 1996.
There are, however, also arguments that speak more strongly against 
EMU membership today. First, the Commission’s fears about a loss in cred-
ibility for Swedish monetary policy and the Swedish currency never materi-
alized. As we will see next, Swedish long-  term interest rates have converged 
substantially toward European rates, although not to the same extent as 
those in the EMU member countries. Second, the recent literature does not 
ﬁ  nd strong support for the proposition that Sweden has lost political inﬂ  u-
ence within the EU (see section 10.6). And third, while there was a broad 
public debate about Swedish EMU membership ahead of the referendum in 
2003, public opinion seems to be largely against membership.3
All in all, the events of the past ten years help to gain perspective on 
some of the important issues concerning Swedish membership in EMU that 
were discussed by the Calmfors Commission. However, at this stage it is not 
clear whether the case for membership has become stronger or weaker. The 
remaining sections will therefore cover many of these issues in more detail.
10.3    European  Business  Cycles
In this section I give an overview of the convergence of business cycles 
in Europe. The purpose is to give a broad view of the similarities of the 
3. According to Statistics Sweden, since 2004 around 50 percent of the Swedish popula-
tion have been against EMU membership while 35 to 40 percent have been for membership. 
However, a more recent poll by Sifo Research International (in October 2008) suggests that 
the balances may have shifted somewhat in favor of membership, with 47 percent against and 
42 percent for.384    Ulf  Söderström
Swedish and euro area business cycles, and thus the possible consequences 
for  Sweden of joining the monetary union, and to compare with other Euro-
pean countries that have chosen diﬀerent strategies in their relationship with 
the EU and the EMU. I thus compare Swedish data with those of the euro 
area as a whole and three groups of countries. The ﬁ  rst group contains the 
four largest euro area member countries: France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. 
The second group consists of three Nordic countries: Denmark, which is a 
member of the EU but not of EMU, although it maintains a ﬁ  xed   exchange 
rate against the euro within ERM II; Finland, which is a member of EMU; 
and Norway, which remains outside the EU. Finally, I include in the com-
parison the United Kingdom, which like Sweden is a member of the EU, 
but neither of EMU nor ERM II.4
To evaluate convergence and the eﬀects of EMU, I compare data from 
two subsamples: the period before EMU from 1994 to 1998, and the period 
after the launch of EMU from 1999 to 2007.5 The data were collected from 
various sources; see the appendix for details.
I study the properties of business cycles in the selected countries in terms 
of the average level and volatility of a number of business cycle indicators in 
the diﬀerent countries and their correlation with the euro area: GDP growth 
and the GDP gap (the percent deviation of GDP from trend); the rate of 
unemployment; the consumer price index (CPI) inﬂ  ation rate; short-  term 
(three-  month) and long-  term (ten-  year) interest rates; and the nominal and 
real exchange rates.
The data are presented in ﬁ  gures 10.1 through 10.8, while tables 10.1 
through 10.3 show sample means, standard deviations, and correlations with 
the euro area for the two subperiods. The main impression is that there is 
strong comovement of business cycles across Europe. Most countries expe-
rienced an expansion in 1997 to 2000 with high growth, increasing output 
gaps, and falling unemployment. This period was followed by a contraction 
in 2001 to 2003, with low growth, falling output gaps, and increasing unem-
ployment, but since around 2003, most countries have experienced a gradual 
expansion of economic activity. At the same time, inﬂ  ation and interest rates 
fell dramatically from the early 1990s until around 1999, after which they 
have been stabilized at low levels. In particular, long- term interest rates have 
converged strongly since the early 1990s, and in particular after 1999 (with 
the possible exception of Norway and the United Kingdom).6 Also Swedish 
interest rates (short-  and long- term) have converged toward the EMU rates, 
4. The case of the United Kingdom is analyzed in detail in chapter 11 in this volume by 
DiCecio and Nelson.
5. I choose 1994 as the starting point for the pre-  EMU sample to avoid the turbulent years 
in the early 1990s in Sweden and many other European countries.
6. Ehrmann et al. (2007) study in detail the convergence of interest rates within the euro 
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less so than in the EMU member countries and Denmark, but more than in 
Norway and the United Kingdom.
Table 10.1 shows that most countries have experienced lower average GDP 
growth, unemployment, and short-  and long- term interest rates in the post-
  EMU period than before 1999, while inﬂ  ation has been low throughout the 
sample period. On average, Sweden has experienced higher GDP growth, 
lower unemployment, and lower inﬂ  ation than most euro area countries in 
both sample periods. Table 10.2 shows that Sweden, along with Italy, Spain, 
and the other Nordic countries, has tended to have more volatile business 
cycles than the three large economies (Germany, France, and the United 
Kingdom) and than the euro area at large.
As for business cycle correlations, table 10.3 shows that the Swedish GDP 
Fig. 10.1    Annual GDP growth rate in the euro area and selected European 
economies, 1990–  2007
Source: OECD.
Notes: Four-  quarter GDP growth rate in euro area (thick line) and selected European coun-
tries (thin line). Percent per annum. The vertical line represents the launch of EMU in January 
1999.386    Ulf  Söderström
growth and GDP gap are fairly strongly correlated with its euro area coun-
terparts, with correlation coeﬃcients above 0.70 after 1999. Although the 
Swedish business cycle correlation with the euro area is weaker than those 
of the largest euro area members, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain (which 
often have correlation coeﬃcients around 0.9), the business cycle in Sweden 
seems more strongly correlated with the euro area than in Norway and the 
United Kingdom, and the correlation is similar to that in Denmark and 
Finland.
To summarize, European business cycles are closely correlated with each 
other, and the Swedish business cycle is no exception. Although the large 
EMU members show even stronger comovement with the euro area, Sweden 
tends to be at least as strongly correlated with the euro area as some EMU 
members (for instance, Finland), and more closely correlated than Norway 
Fig. 10.2    GDP gap in the euro area and selected European economies, 1990–  2007
Source: OECD.
Notes: Percent deviation of GDP from trend in euro area (thick line) and selected European 
countries (thin line). The trend was calculated by the author using the Hodrick-  Prescott ﬁ  lter 
over the entire sample and a smoothing parameter of 1,600. The vertical line represents the 
launch of EMU in January 1999.Reevaluating Swedish Membership in the European Monetary Union    3 8 7
and the United Kingdom. This evidence suggests that European business 
cycles are to a large extent driven by common shocks. If this is the case, 
then membership in EMU would not be very costly for Sweden, and not 
more so than for some current EMU members. However, before drawing 
this conclusion, we take a further step by using an estimated model to study 
the importance of country-  speciﬁ  c shocks relative to foreign shocks for the 
Swedish economy.
10.4      The Role of Country-  Speciﬁ  c Shocks and Exchange 
Rate Volatility for Macroeconomic Fluctuations
The traditional arguments against monetary union rest on two assertions. 
First, independent monetary policy is helpful to stabilize the economy after 
Fig. 10.3    Unemployment rate in the euro area and selected European economies, 
1990– 2007
Source: OECD.
Notes: Standardized unemployment rate in euro area (thick line) and selected European coun-
tries (thin line). Percent per annum. The vertical line represents the launch of EMU in January 
1999.388    Ulf  Söderström
country- speciﬁ  c (or “asymmetric”) shocks. Such shocks could therefore be 
costly in a monetary union where the common central bank would not adjust 
policy suﬃciently, as it focuses on stabilizing the union-  wide economy. Sec-
ond, exchange rate movements help to stabilize the economy after shocks. 
For instance, the economy will recover more easily after a contractionary 
shock if the exchange rate is allowed to depreciate, something that will not 
be possible within a monetary union. Both arguments are more important 
for a small open economy such as Sweden, which would carry a small weight 
within the monetary union and where exchange rate movements have a 
strong eﬀect on the economy.
The importance of the ﬁ  rst argument depends on the prevalence of 
country- speciﬁ  c shocks: the more important are these shocks for the domes-
Fig.  10.4  CPI  inﬂ  ation rate in the euro area and selected European economies, 
1990– 2007
Source: OECD.
Notes: Four-  quarter CPI inﬂ  ation rates in euro area (thick line) and selected European coun-
tries (thin line). Quarterly averages of monthly data, percent per annum. The vertical line 
represents the launch of EMU in January 1999.Reevaluating Swedish Membership in the European Monetary Union    3 8 9
tic economy, the more critical is independent monetary policy. However, 
the evidence from section 10.3 suggests that common shocks may be more 
important than country-  speciﬁ  c shocks for European business cycles. The 
validity of the second argument rests on the notion that the nominal exchange 
rate adjusts appropriately after shocks. But exchange rate movements are 
known not to be very strongly linked to fundamentals (see, for instance, 
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ [2001]). If exchange rate movements are driven mainly 
by idiosyncratic shocks (for instance, to the foreign exchange risk premium), 
they may induce additional volatility rather than help the economy to adjust 
after shocks.7
In this section, I try to shed more light on these issues by studying the 
Fig. 10.5    Short-  term interest rate in the euro area and selected European 
economies, 1990–  2007
Source: OECD.
Notes: Three-  month interest rates in euro area (thick line) and selected European countries 
(thin line). Quarterly averages, percent per annum. The vertical line represents the launch of 
EMU in January 1999.
7. This argument is emphasized by several of the contributions in Jakobsson (2003).390    Ulf  Söderström
importance of shocks for the Swedish economy in a model of a small open 
economy developed and estimated on Swedish data by Adolfson et al. (2007) 
and Adolfson et al. (2008).8
10.4.1      A Model of a Small Open Economy
The model used for these exercises is a Dynamic Stochastic General Equi-
librium (DSGE) model with optimizing agents and rational expectations. 
The model economy consist of four groups of agents: households, ﬁ  rms, 
the government, and the foreign economy. Households maximize utility 
over an inﬁ  nite horizon. They consume a basket of domestically produced 
Fig. 10.6    Long-  term interest rate in the euro area and selected European 
economies, 1990–  2007
Source: OECD.
Notes: Ten-  year government bond yield in euro area (thick line) and selected European coun-
tries (thin line). Quarterly averages, percent per annum. The vertical line represents the launch 
of EMU in January 1999.
8. Adolfson, Laséen, et al. (2007) provide a more detailed nontechnical description.Reevaluating Swedish Membership in the European Monetary Union    3 9 1
goods and imported goods, which are supplied by domestic and import-
ing ﬁ  rms, respectively. Households save in domestic and foreign currency-
  denominated nominal bonds, but must pay a premium on foreign bond 
holdings, a premium that depends on the domestic economy’s net foreign 
asset position and an idiosyncratic shock. Households also own the capital 
stock, which they rent to domestic ﬁ  rms, and they decide the rate of capital 
accumulation given costs of adjusting the rate of investment. Finally, house-
holds supply a diﬀerentiated labor service under monopolistic competition 
and staggered wages.
The choice between domestic and foreign bond holdings implies that 
domestic and foreign interest rates are linked by an uncovered interest rate 
parity (UIP) condition. However, the premium on foreign bond holdings 
leads to an exchange rate risk premium that generates short-  run deviations 
Fig. 10.7    Nominal exchange rate against the ECU/  euro in selected European 
economies, 1990–  2007
Source: FRED data base, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Notes: Domestic currency price of ECU/  euro. Quarterly averages of daily data. The vertical 
line represents the launch of EMU in January 1999.392    Ulf  Söderström
from the fundamental value of the exchange rate determined by UIP. Idio-
syncratic shocks to this risk premium generate volatility in the exchange rate 
and therefore ineﬃcient ﬂ  uctuations in the economy.
There are three types of ﬁ  rms—in the domestic, import, and export 
sectors—that produce diﬀerentiated goods under monopolistic competi-
tion and set prices in a staggered fashion. Domestic ﬁ  rms either produce 
consumption or investment goods. Staggered prices on imports and exports 
imply that exchange rate pass-  through to both import and export prices is 
incomplete in the short run. Thus, changes in the exchange rate do not imme-
diately feed through to import and export prices, but only after a gradual 
process of price changes.
The government spends resources on consuming part of the domestic 
Fig. 10.8    Real exchange rate against the ECU/  euro in selected European econo-
mies, 1990–  2007
Sources: Author’s calculation based on data from the FRED data base, Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis (nominal exchange rates), and OECD (consumer prices).
Notes: Nominal exchange rate (domestic currency price of ECU/  euro) deﬂ  ated by the con-
sumer price level. Quarterly averages, 1999  100. The vertical line represents the launch of 
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good, collects taxes from households, and sets monetary policy. The ﬁ  scal 
surplus/ deﬁ  cit plus the seigniorage are transferred back to the households in 
a lump sum fashion. Monetary policy is delegated to an independent central 
bank that sets the interest rate according to a Taylor (1993)- type interest rate 
rule. In particular, the one- period nominal interest rate is set as a function of 
current and past CPI inﬂ  ation, the deviation of current and past GDP from 
trend, and the real exchange rate and the interest rate in the previous quarter. 
In addition, there is a shock to the interest rate rule that captures temporary 
deviations from the systematic behavior of monetary policy.
Finally, as Sweden is a small open economy, the foreign economy is assumed 
to be independent of the Swedish economy, so foreign inﬂ  ation, output, and 
the foreign interest rate follow an exogenous vector autoregressive (VAR) 
model. The foreign variables are trade-  weighted averages of foreign data.
In total, the model describes the evolution of twenty-  seven variables, ﬁ  f-
teen of which are observable. The model also includes twenty-  one diﬀerent 
exogenous disturbances: one is a nonstationary global technology shock 
common to the domestic and foreign economies, nine shocks are speciﬁ  c 
to the domestic economy (including a stationary technology shock), three 
originate in the foreign economy, seven are related to monetary and ﬁ  scal 
policy, and the remaining shock is to the foreign exchange risk premium. The 
model is rewritten in terms of stationary variables, log- linearized around its 
steady state, and then estimated by Adolfson, Andersson, et al. (2007) on 
quarterly data from 1980 until the third quarter of 2005, with a structural 
break in the ﬁ  rst quarter of 1993, as Sweden moved from a ﬁ  xed-  exchange 
rate regime to a regime with an inﬂ  ation target and a ﬂ  exible exchange rate. 
I here present results pertaining to the period starting in 1993.
10.4.2      The Sources of Macroeconomic Fluctuations
To analyze the relative importance of diﬀerent shocks in the estimated 
model, I decompose the volatility of key variables—annual domestic and 
CPI inﬂ  ation, annual GDP growth, the annualized short-  term interest rate, 
and the real exchange rate—at diﬀerent horizons into the fraction caused 
by each shock. I then study these variance decompositions to see (a) what 
has been the relative importance of domestic shocks for overall volatility; 
and (b) what has been the relative importance of exchange rate shocks for 
volatility in the exchange rate and in the economy at large.
The results are reported in table 10.4.9 First, section (a) shows the total 
forecast error variance (in percentage points) in each variable at diﬀerent 
horizons. The dynamics of the model implies that most of the volatility 
appears after four quarters, and the real exchange rate is more volatile and 
persistent than the other variables.
9. The variance decompositions are calculated from impulse responses to each shock. In the 
calculations I exclude a shock to the inﬂ  ation target, as this has been constant since 1993.Reevaluating Swedish Membership in the European Monetary Union    3 9 7
Section (b) reveals that shocks originating in the domestic economy 
account for much of the variability in domestic variables at all horizons. In 
the short run, domestic shocks account for 55 to 95 percent of the volatility 
in CPI inﬂ  ation, 65 to 85 percent of the volatility in GDP growth, and 35 
to 55 percent of the volatility in the short-  term interest rate. Also, at longer 
horizons domestic shocks account for most of the volatility of all variables. 
Shocks originating in the foreign economy in section (c), on the other hand, 
account for between 15 and 25 percent of the volatility of CPI inﬂ  ation 
volatility, GDP growth, and the short-  term interest rate. Thus, although 
the analysis in section 10.3 suggested the existence of an important com-
mon component in the Swedish and euro area business cycles, the estimated 
Table 10.4  Variance decomposition in estimated model
Horizon (quarters)  
Domestic 
inﬂ  ation  
CPI 
inﬂ  ation  
GDP 
growth rate  
Short- term 




1 0.71 0.51 0.48 0.23 5.52
4 1.00 0.89 0.97 0.25 23.57
20 0.02 0.11 0.08 0.05 3.23
40 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.61
(b) Fraction due to domestic 
  shocks
1 99.4 95.2 83.5 35.0 19.6
4 90.6 54.6 66.2 53.7 15.2
20 35.8 32.0 45.8 66.2 74.1
40 68.3 71.2 59.4 71.1 73.3
(c) Fraction due to foreign shocks
1 0.3 1.3 5.0 0.9 3.7
4 4.9 15.6 17.2 16.1 11.2
20 29.3 23.9 19.1 18.1 1.1
40 30.2 8.8 9.3 28.2 22.2
(d) Fraction due to exchange rate
  shock
1 0.3 2.8 1.4 1.8 75.4
4 3.9 27.0 12.3 21.2 71.7
20 34.0 43.1 31.9 15.6 24.6
40 0.0 19.0 29.7 0.1 4.0
(e) Fraction due to policy shocks
1 0.0 0.7 10.2 62.4 1.3
4 0.6 2.8 4.4 9.0 1.9
20 0.9 0.9 3.2 0.1 0.2
40   1.5   1.0   1.6   0.7   0.4
Notes: This table reports the forecast error variance of key variables (in percentage points) in the esti-
mated model at diﬀerent horizons and the fraction of this variance (in percent) that is due to diﬀerent 
sets of shocks. The GDP growth rate and the inﬂ  ation rates are four-  quarter rates, all data are expressed 
as percent per annum. The shock to the time varying inﬂ  ation target was excluded from the calculations; 
the policy shocks include shocks to monetary policy (to the interest rate rule) and to ﬁ  scal policy (to tax 
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model ﬁ  nds that country- speciﬁ  c shocks are two to three times more impor-
tant than foreign shocks for Swedish business cycle ﬂ  uctuations.
There are reasons to be careful when interpreting these results. Justiniano 
and Preston (2006) argue that models of small open economies such as the 
one used here are not very successful in capturing the inﬂ  uence of foreign 
variables. While the common nonstationary technology shock in our model 
increases the inﬂ  uence of foreign shocks relative to their model, our model 
still does not seem to capture all comovement of the domestic and foreign 
economies. For instance, the model implies an unconditional contempo-
raneous correlation between domestic and foreign output growth of 0.19, 
while in the data used to estimate the model this correlation is 0.54; the cor-
relation of domestic and foreign inﬂ  ation is 0.05 in the model and 0.29 in the 
data; and the interest rate correlation is 0.16 in the model but 0.86 in the data. 
While the inﬂ  ation correlation in the data is inside a 95 percent probability 
interval around the model correlations, the correlations of output and the 
interest rate are not. Thus, the model may well overestimate the importance 
of domestic shocks relative to foreign shocks.
Comparisons with vector autoregressive (VAR) models estimated on 
Swedish data give mixed support for this view. In a background study for the 
Calmfors Commission, Jansson (1997) studied the importance of country-
 speciﬁ  c shocks in an estimated VAR model using data from eleven European 
countries over the period from 1960 to 1994. He found that country- speciﬁ  c 
shocks accounted for 75 to 80 percent of ﬂ  uctuations in Swedish GDP as 
well as in the GDP deﬂ  ator, with the remaining 20 to 25 percent being due 
to common (that is, foreign) shocks. In comparison, country- speciﬁ  c shocks 
accounted for merely 25 to 30 percent of GDP ﬂ  uctuations in the core EMU 
countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands), but 93 
percent in Finland and Ireland. This evidence is consistent with the results 
in section (b). On the other hand, Lindé (2003) studies a VAR model of the 
Swedish economy estimated over the more recent period from 1986 to 2002. 
He reports that foreign shocks account for 45 to 55 percent of ﬂ  uctuations 
in Swedish domestic inﬂ  ation and GDP, in particular at low frequencies. 
This evidence thus assigns a less important role to country-  speciﬁ  c shocks 
than do the open economy model and the evidence of Jansson (1997), also 
suggesting that the open economy model underestimates the inﬂ  uence of 
foreign shocks on the Swedish economy.
We now turn to the importance of shocks to the exchange rate. Section 
(d) of table 10.4 shows that such shocks account for a large fraction of the 
volatility in the real exchange rate (above 70 percent at short horizons), but 
also 25 to 45 percent of medium-  term volatility in CPI inﬂ  ation (which 
to some extent is directly determined by exchange rate movements), 15 to 
30 percent of GDP growth volatility, and 15 to 20 percent of interest rate 
volatility at medium- term horizons. Thus, exchange rate movements do help Reevaluating Swedish Membership in the European Monetary Union    3 9 9
to stabilize the economy after disturbances in other sectors, as close to 30 
percent of the volatility in the real exchange is due to endogenous responses 
to other shocks. However, the remaining volatility in the exchange rate is 
due to ineﬃcient ﬂ  uctuations in the exchange rate risk premium, which act 
to destabilize the Swedish economy, and these shocks are responsible for a 
signiﬁ  cant portion of Swedish business cycle ﬂ  uctuations.10
The evidence presented here thus gives a mixed view of the costs and ben-
eﬁ  ts of monetary union. On the one hand, the estimated model suggests that 
country- speciﬁ  c shocks are an important source of Swedish business cycle 
ﬂ  uctuations, and therefore that independent monetary policy is imperative in 
order to stabilize the economy. (There is reason, though, to suspect that the 
model overestimates the inﬂ  uence of country- speciﬁ  c shocks.) On the other 
hand, exchange rate ﬂ  uctuations are mainly driven by ineﬃcient shocks to 
the exchange rate risk premium, which are responsible for a large portion of 
macroeconomic volatility, implying that the beneﬁ  ts of a ﬂ  exible exchange 
rate may be small.11
10.5      What If Sweden Had Joined EMU in 1999? 
A Counterfactual Experiment
A strength of the estimated model is that it is based on the optimizing 
behavior of private households and ﬁ  rms, and the estimated parameters re-
ﬂ  ect structural features of the economy, such as preferences and technology, 
which in principle should be independent of the behavior of monetary and 
ﬁ  scal policy. We can, therefore, use the model to perform counterfactual 
policy experiments without being vulnerable to the Lucas (1976) critique.12
Thus, in this section I use the model to evaluate what would have been 
the consequences if Sweden had joined EMU at the outset in January 1999. 
The discussion in section 10.3 showed that the Swedish economy is fairly 
well aligned with the euro area, suggesting that membership in EMU might 
not have had important consequences for Sweden. On the other hand, the 
evidence presented in section 10.4 showed that country- speciﬁ  c shocks have 
10. In chapter 11 in this volume, DiCecio and Nelson argue that shocks to the exchange rate 
risk premium may be endogenous responses to fundamentals rather than ineﬃcient distur-
bances. The estimated model used here, however, interprets all such movements as ineﬃcient 
disturbances to the exchange rate.
11. For the United Kingdom, HM Treasury (2003) reports that most movements in the 
exchange rate between the British pound and the euro have been stabilizing; that is, move-
ments in response to other shocks. This conclusion is based, ﬁ  rst, on the fact that the sterling 
exchange rate largely has moved in the appropriate direction with respect to the position of the 
U.K. business cycle relative to foreign economies, and second, on evidence from an estimated 
VAR model where exchange rate shocks have a negligible impact on output, prices, and interest 
rates in the U.K.
12. Recently, however, Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2009) and Faust (2008) have criticized 
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been the main source of business cycle ﬂ  uctuations in Sweden since 1993, 
suggesting that EMU membership might be costly. The counterfactual 
experiment can help us balance these conﬂ  icting views.
10.5.1    A  First  Impression
For a ﬁ  rst informal impression, ﬁ  gure 10.9 shows the monetary policy 
interest rate, the rate of GDP growth, and the CPI inﬂ  ation rate in Sweden 
and the euro area since 1999. The horizontal lines in panel (c) represent the 
Riksbank’s tolerance band from 1 to 3 percent around its 2 percent inﬂ  a-
tion target.
Initially, in 1999 and early 2000, GDP growth was higher and inﬂ  ation 
lower in Sweden than in the euro area, and on balance, monetary policy 
was slightly more contractionary in Sweden. As inﬂ  ation and GDP growth 
picked up in the euro area, the ECB increased the interest rate more aggres-
sively than the Riksbank in 2000, and kept a more contractionary policy 
Fig. 10.9    Monetary policy rate, GDP growth rate, and CPI inﬂ  ation rate in the 
euro area and Sweden, 1999–  2007
Sources: European Central Bank, Sveriges Riksbank, and OECD.
Notes: ECB reﬁ  nancing rate and Sveriges Riksbank repo rate, quarterly averages of daily 
data; Four-  quarter GDP growth rate, quarterly data; Four-  quarter CPI inﬂ  ation rate, quar-
terly averages of monthly data. Percent per annum. The horizontal lines in panel (c) represent 
the Riksbank’s tolerance band around its 2 percent inﬂ  ation target.Reevaluating Swedish Membership in the European Monetary Union    4 0 1
until the end of 2001. The recession that started in 2001 was more long- lived 
in the euro area than in Sweden, necessitating a more aggressive monetary 
expansion by the ECB, with the Riksbank following about a year later when 
inﬂ  ation started falling in Sweden. The higher rate of inﬂ  ation in the euro 
area also made the ECB tighten monetary policy earlier and more aggres-
sively in 2006 and 2007. Consequently, monetary policy was more contrac-
tionary in Sweden than in the euro area throughout 2002 and 2003, but 
more expansionary in 2005 to 2007. In general, the two interest rates have 
followed similar cycles, but the euro area interest rate has tended to lead the 
Swedish interest rate.
Panel (b) shows that although ﬂ  uctuations in GDP growth have been 
closely correlated, the GDP growth rate has been higher in Sweden than in 
the euro area in almost every quarter since 1999 (with the exception of the 
2001 contraction). At the same time, inﬂ  ation in panel (c) has typically been 
lower (and more volatile) in Sweden than in the euro area. In particular, 
the Swedish CPI inﬂ  ation rate was below 1 percent (the lower bound of the 
Riksbank’s tolerance band) in 1999 and 2000 and in 2004 and 2005.
Due to the uncertain lags in the transmission of monetary policy, it is 
diﬃcult to say how Swedish membership in EMU from 1999 would have 
aﬀected the behavior of GDP growth and inﬂ  ation in Sweden. The ECB’s 
more contractionary monetary policy in 2000 and 2001 might have been 
appropriate in the boom experienced in Sweden in 2000, and the more ex-
pansionary policy in 2002 and 2003 might have dampened the brief down-
turn in 2003 and increased inﬂ  ation somewhat in 2004 and 2005, when 
inﬂ  ation in Sweden was exceptionally low. However, with slightly longer 
transmission lags, a more contractionary monetary policy in 2000 and 2001 
might have deepened the downturn in 2003, with even lower inﬂ  ation as a 
consequence.
10.5.2      Evidence from the Estimated Model
To construct a more rigorous counterfactual experiment I use the esti-
mated model to analyze the possible eﬀects of Swedish EMU membership 
from 1999 until 2005.13 In particular, I impose the euro area short-  term 
interest rate instead of the Swedish interest rate and simulate the model 
starting from the actual situation in the fourth quarter of 1998, feeding in the 
estimated historical series of the disturbances (excluding those to monetary 
policy and the exchange rate). I thus obtain model predictions of what would 
have been the development of the Swedish economy if the interest rate had 
followed the ECB interest rate since January 1999.14
13. The experiment ends in the third quarter of 2005 as this is the last observation used when 
estimating the model.
14. If the model had been estimated on Swedish and euro area data, it would have been 
natural to simply set the Swedish interest rate equal to the foreign interest rate, implying 
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To impose the ECB interest rate on the model, I follow two diﬀerent 
strategies. In the ﬁ  rst strategy, I introduce shocks to the estimated monetary 
policy rule so that the interest rate coincides with the ECB interest rate. This 
exercise manages to exactly mimic the ECB policy, but it assumes that these 
deviations from the estimated policy rule are unexpected by private agents, 
and so it does not capture the eﬀects of systematic monetary policy. That is, 
private agents expect the Riksbank to follow the estimated Swedish policy 
rule, but are surprised in every period by the fact that Sweden is in fact a 
member of EMU.
As an alternative strategy, I instead respecify the monetary policy rule 
in the model so that it responds also to the rate of nominal exchange rate 
depreciation and ﬂ  uctuations in the foreign economy (the current level and 
three lags of foreign output, inﬂ  ation, and interest rate). I then ﬁ  nd the 
coeﬃcients in this monetary policy rule that best match the behavior of the 
ECB interest rate since 1999.
Before presenting the results of these two experiments, ﬁ  gure 10.10 com-
pares the model predictions of the short-  term interest rate, GDP growth, 
domestic inﬂ  ation, and CPI inﬂ  ation with the estimated monetary policy 
rule. We note that the model tends to underpredict GDP growth in 2001 
to 2004, while capturing fairly well the movements in domestic and CPI 
inﬂ  ation.15
Introducing Counterfactual Monetary Policy Shocks
Panels (a) and (b) of ﬁ  gure 10.11 show the interest rate when introducing 
the counterfactual monetary policy shocks in the estimated interest rate rule, 
and the implied shocks needed to mimic the ECB interest rate. These shocks 
are not particularly large: their standard deviation is 7 basis points, and the 
largest shock is 14 basis points. For comparison, the standard deviation of 
monetary policy shocks in the estimated model is 10 basis points. Fairly 
small shocks are thus required to make the Swedish interest rate mimic the 
ECB interest rate.
Figure 10.12 shows the predicted development of GDP growth, domestic 
inﬂ  ation, and CPI inﬂ  ation with the counterfactual monetary policy shocks. 
shocks). However, the foreign variables in the model represent trade-  weighted averages of 
foreign data, where the euro area (including Denmark) only represents around 60 percent. 
Therefore, this strategy is not possible. Furthermore, as the trade- weighted exchange rate would 
have ﬂ  uctuated in ways that are diﬃcult to predict even if Sweden had been an EMU member, 
I do not study the consequences of EMU membership for the exchange rate.
15. The deviations of GDP growth and inﬂ  ation from the actual data are due to measurement 
errors introduced when estimating the model. Without these measurement errors, the model 
would have perfectly matched the actual data, as these data were used in the estimation. See 
Adolfson et al. (2008) for details. Note also that the data for the GDP growth rate in ﬁ  gure 10.10 
are slightly diﬀerent from those in ﬁ  gures 10.1 and 10.9. The data in ﬁ  gure 10.10 are seasonally 
adjusted data obtained from Statistics Sweden, while those in the earlier ﬁ  gures are unadjusted 
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Even if the required shocks are fairly small, the eﬀects are nevertheless rea-
sonably large. With the ECB interest rate, Swedish GDP growth would have 
been slightly lower in the 2000 and 2001 recession (due to the more contrac-
tionary monetary policy), but higher in the period from 2002 to 2003 (after 
a more expansionary policy). The CPI inﬂ  ation would have been higher in 
2000, lower in 2001, and higher in 2002 to 2005. In particular, the ECB policy 
would have kept Swedish CPI inﬂ  ation more closely within the Riksbank’s 
tolerance band of 1 to 3 percent in 2004 and 2005.
On average, this exercise suggests that EMU membership would have 
raised Swedish GDP growth by around 0.1 percentage points per year and 
inﬂ  ation by around 0.25 percentage points; see sections (b) and (c) of table 
10.5. Inﬂ  ation would also have been less volatile under the ECB policy with 
no eﬀects on the volatility of GDP growth.
Under this scenario, EMU membership would thus have been unambigu-
ously beneﬁ  cial for Sweden.
Fig. 10.10    The Swedish economy 1999–  2005 according to actual data and the esti-
mated model
Notes: Average quarterly data, four-  quarter GDP growth rate, and inﬂ  ation rates, percent per 
annum. The horizontal lines in panel (d) represent the Riksbank’s tolerance band around its 
2 percent inﬂ  ation target.404    Ulf  Söderström
Imposing a Counterfactual Monetary Policy Rule
Panels (c) and (d) of ﬁ  gure 10.11 instead show the interest rate obtained 
with the counterfactual policy rule. In this case it is not possible to perfectly 
mimic the ECB interest rate, and occasionally there are large deviations of 
the counterfactual interest rate from the ECB interest rate. Nevertheless, the 
counterfactual interest rate follows the same cyclical patterns as the ECB 
interest rate, and, as shown in ﬁ  gure 10.13, it implies the same qualitative 
eﬀects of EMU relative to the Swedish interest rate: more contractionary 
monetary policy in 2000 and 2001 and 2004 and 2005 and more expansion-
ary policy in 1999 and 2001 to 2004. Figure 10.13 shows that the coun-
terfactual rule (which captures the systematic eﬀects of monetary policy) 
has a stronger eﬀect on the economy than the rule with the counterfactual 
shocks in ﬁ  gure 10.12, and as shown in panel (d) of table 10.5, GDP growth 
is substantially more volatile with the counterfactual rule. The overall pat-
terns are similar, however. The counterfactual rule model predicts that GDP 
growth would have been lower than the actual growth rate in 2000 and early 
2001, but higher in late 2001 and early 2002 and in late 2003 and early 2004, 
Fig. 10.11    ECB interest rate 1999–  2005 and the interest rate in the models with 
counterfactual monetary policy shocks or a counterfactual monetary policy rule
Note: Average quarterly data, percent per annum.Reevaluating Swedish Membership in the European Monetary Union    4 0 5
similar to the model with counterfactual shocks. Also, the counterfactual 
rule model implies that CPI inﬂ  ation would have been lower in 2000 and 
2001 but higher in 2002 to 2005. Finally, the ECB policy would have kept 
inﬂ  ation within the target range in 2004 and 2005, but in this case, inﬂ  ation 
would have been far below the lower bound in 2000.
This counterfactual experiment thus gives a more ambiguous, but largely 
negative, picture: EMU membership would have increased average GDP 
growth only marginally (by 0.05 percentage points), but increased its vola-
tility substantially (by around 0.25 percentage points), and the eﬀects on 
inﬂ  ation would have been small on average.
10.5.3    Going  Forward
The model was estimated by Adolfson, Andersson, et al. (2007) using data 
only up until the third quarter of 2005, so it cannot make any predictions 
about the development in more recent years. Nevertheless, going back to 
ﬁ  gure 10.9, we see that inﬂ  ation in both economies has picked up in 2007, 
Fig. 10.12    The Swedish economy 1999–  2005 according to the estimated model and 
the model with counterfactual monetary policy shocks
Notes: Average quarterly data, four-  quarter GDP growth rate, and inﬂ  ation rates, percent per 
annum. The horizontal lines in panel (d) represent the Riksbank’s tolerance band around its 
2 percent inﬂ  ation target.406    Ulf  Söderström
and more recently (in October 2008) reached 4.0 percent in Sweden and 3.2 
percent in the euro area. At the same time GDP growth has slowed down to 
0.9 percent in Sweden and 1.4 percent in the euro area in the second quar-
ter of 2008 (according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development [OECD]). As shown in panel (a), the ECB started increasing 
its interest rate already in late 2005, and until late 2007, the ECB interest rate 
was 50 to 75 basis points above the Riksbank rate. Had we been able to con-
tinue our experiments through 2007, the model with the ECB interest rate 
might therefore have predicted lower inﬂ  ation but also lower GDP growth 
in Sweden in 2007 and 2008 than has been the case in practice.
10.6    Additional  Issues
The estimated model used in the counterfactual experiments was devel-
oped to explain the eﬀects of monetary policy on the economy and the 
interplay between monetary policy and private sector behavior. However, it 
is largely silent on many other possible consequences of EMU membership. 
Therefore, in this section I brieﬂ  y discuss some of these issues.
10.6.1      Fiscal Policy and the Stability and Growth Pact
Fiscal policy in EMU member countries is constrained by the possibility 
of sanctions if the rules speciﬁ  ed in the Stability and Growth Pact are vio-
lated. These rules require government debt to be below 60 percent of GDP 
Table 10.5  Properties of actual data and simulated model data, 1999–2005
Horizon (years)  
Short- term 
interest rate  
GDP 
growth rate  
Domestic 




Mean 3.18 2.61 1.46 1.53
Standard deviation 0.83 1.26 0.59 0.95
(b) Estimated model
Mean 3.18 2.17 1.39 1.55
Standard deviation 0.83 1.42 0.60 0.97
(c) Model with counterfactual monetary
  policy  shocks
Mean 2.96 2.28 1.56 1.79
Standard deviation 0.95 1.41 0.50 0.82
(d) Model with counterfactual monetary
  policy  rule
Mean 2.96 2.23 1.96 1.56
 Standard  deviation   0.97   1.68   0.68   0.92
Notes: This table reports the mean and standard deviation of key macroeconomic variables in actual 
data, the estimated model, and two models with counterfactual paths for the short-  term interest rate. 
Original data are measured as quarterly averages, the GDP growth rate and the inﬂ  ation rates are four- 
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and the deﬁ  cit in the government’s ﬁ  nances to be below 3 percent of GDP. 
Would these restrictions on ﬁ  scal policy have had important implications 
for Sweden as an EMU member? Probably not. According to Eurostat, 
Sweden had in 2007 a government surplus of 3.6 percent of GDP and a 
gross debt-  to-  GDP ratio of 40.4 percent. And in the period since 1999, 
the largest government deﬁ  cit in Sweden has been 1.2 percent of GDP (in 
2002) and the largest debt ratio 65.6 percent of GDP (in 1999). According 
to the assessments made by the European Commission, Sweden has there-
fore always fulﬁ  lled the criterion of ﬁ  scal sustainability, so the Stability and 
Growth Pact would likely not have constrained ﬁ  scal policy if Sweden had 
joined EMU in 1999.
10.6.2    Economic  Integration
An important motivating factor behind the creation of EMU was to en-
hance economic integration within the European Union and thus increase 
competition and economic eﬃciency. Many studies have also tried to mea-
Fig. 10.13    The Swedish economy 1999–  2005 according to the estimated model and 
the model with a counterfactual monetary policy rule
Notes: Average quarterly data, four-  quarter GDP growth rate, and inﬂ  ation rates, percent per 
annum. The horizontal lines in panel (d) represent the Riksbank’s tolerance band around its 
2 percent inﬂ  ation target.408    Ulf  Söderström
sure the impact of EMU on economic integration, such as international trade 
patterns, ﬁ  nancial market integration, and foreign direct investment (FDI).
While the estimated model does take into account the short-  run eﬀects 
of monetary policy on imports and exports, it assumes that the long-  run 
trade shares are constant, and therefore is unable to make any predictions 
about the eﬀects of EMU membership on long-  run trade patterns. Simi-
larly, the counterfactual exercises mimic ﬁ  nancial integration by removing 
the premium on foreign bond holdings for Swedish residents. But ﬁ  nancial 
integration can be expected to happen also in other ﬁ  nancial markets. And 
the model is completely silent on the impact of monetary union on foreign 
direct investment.
A large literature has measured the eﬀects of EMU on international trade. 
Most of these studies have shown that the creation of EMU has increased 
trade between the member countries, although the exact estimates vary. 
Micco, Stein, and Ordoñez (2003) estimate that EMU increased trade within 
the euro area by 13 percent per year between 1999 and 2002. They also ﬁ  nd 
that the introduction of the euro increased trade between members and non-
members by an average of 8 percent per year.16 A more recent study by Flam 
and Nordström (2007c) ﬁ  nds that intra-  euro area trade has increased by 26 
percent after the creation of EMU, and trade with non-  EMU members by 
12 percent. In a literature survey, Baldwin (2006) concludes that EMU has 
increased trade between members countries by between 5 and 15 percent, 
with a best estimate of 9 percent, while trade with non-  EMU members has 
increased by around 7 percent.17
Thus, there is no evidence of trade diversion: most studies show that trade 
with non- EMU members has also increased as an eﬀect of the introduction 
of the euro. Swedish trade has therefore already seen increased trade ﬂ  ows 
due to EMU, and according to Baldwin (2006), the additional gains from 
EMU membership may be modest. Flam and Nordström (2007b), on the 
other hand, argue that Swedish trade with the EMU countries would have 
been 13 percent larger in 2002 to 2005 if Sweden had been a member of 
EMU, implying that the costs of staying outside the monetary union may 
have been large.
Empirical studies also suggest that ﬁ  nancial markets have become more 
integrated as a consequence of EMU. De Santis (2006) estimates that portfo-
lio ﬂ  ows (in equity and bonds) among euro area countries increased signiﬁ  -
cantly due to EMU, thus contributing to enhanced regional ﬁ  nancial inte-
gration and risk- sharing, in addition to the elimination of exchange rate risk. 
(See also Lane [2006a, 2006b].) Similarly, Coeurdacier and Martin (2007) 
argue that EMU signiﬁ  cantly reduced transaction costs for equity and bonds 
inside the euro area for all investors, but twice as much for investors from 
16. See also chapter 5 in this volume by Frankel.
17. Melitz (2005) argues that the eﬀect is probably closer to 15 percent than the 9 percent 
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EMU member countries than for non-  EMU investors. Thus, EMU led to a 
diversion eﬀect in that EMU countries purchase less equity from non- EMU 
countries. This evidence suggests that the launch of EMU may have relo-
cated portfolio holdings from Sweden to the EMU member countries, and 
that Sweden might experience an increase in international portfolio inﬂ  ows 
and outﬂ  ows as a consequence of EMU membership, thus enhancing the 
eﬃciency of portfolio diversiﬁ  cation.
As for foreign direct investment (FDI), De Sousa and Lochard (2006) esti-
mate that EMU has stimulated FDI within the euro area: FDI stocks have 
increased by around 20 percent within EMU, and FDI ﬂ  ows have increased 
much more. They ﬁ  nd no evidence of an investment diversion eﬀect: the 
United Kingdom, Denmark, and Sweden have not experienced a fall in FDI 
inﬂ  ows, but rather seem to have experienced a positive eﬀect of EMU. In 
contrast, Flam and Nordström (2007a) do not ﬁ  nd any eﬀects of EMU on 
FDI, but instead argue that the eﬀects on FDI are due to the Single Market. 
Nevertheless, both studies imply that the gains from Swedish membership 
in EMU in terms of FDI would be small.
10.6.3      Labor Markets and Wage Formation
Labor mobility could act as an adjustment mechanism in the presence 
of country-  speciﬁ  c shocks in a monetary union. Compared with, say, the 
United States, labor mobility is fairly low between European countries. There 
are many reasons for this; for instance, language and cultural diﬀerences, 
incompatibilities between bureaucracies, and welfare systems (including 
pension systems). However, labor mobility is low also within European 
countries, suggesting that other factors are also important.
Unfortunately, data on labor mobility across countries are not readily 
available. As a proxy, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International 
Labor Aﬀairs (2002) reports that the average share of movers in the popu-
lation in the 1990s was 7 percent in the European Union but 16 percent in 
the United States. The share also varies considerably across EU countries, 
from around 2.5 percent in Italy to above 15 percent in Finland. Likewise, 
data from the OECD and the U.S. Census Bureau show that the fraction 
of foreign workers in the total labor force is typically below 10 percent in 
European countries, while it is around 15 percent in the United States. There 
is some evidence that labor market reforms have become more frequent after 
the establishment of monetary union, mainly in the direction of deregula-
tion of labor markets (see, for instance, Bertola and Boeri [2002]), although 
it is unclear whether the reforms were an eﬀect of monetary union (see Duval 
and Elmeskov [2005] or chapter 2 in this volume by Alesina, Ardagna, and 
Galasso). Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that labor mobility across EMU 
member states will be suﬃcient to eliminate the eﬀects of country-  speciﬁ  c 
shocks. Also, it is unlikely that the pace of labor market reform would accel-
erate signiﬁ  cantly as a consequence of Swedish EMU membership.
A second issue related to labor markets regards the eﬀect of monetary 410    Ulf  Söderström
union on wage formation. In theory, monetary union may either increase 
or decrease wage restraint. On the one hand, trade unions may internalize 
the eﬀects of wage demands on inﬂ  ation and monetary policy to a smaller 
extent in a monetary union than before, as the eﬀects on union-  wide inﬂ  a-
tion and monetary policy become weaker. This mechanism would imply that 
wage demands become stronger within a monetary union. (See Soskice and 
Iversen [1998] and Cukierman and Lippi [2001] who build on insights from 
Calmfors and Driﬃll [1988].)
On the other hand, trade unions in a monetary union may take into 
account the eﬀects of wage demands on their country’s competitiveness 
to a larger extent, as lost competitiveness cannot be regained by exchange 
rate depreciation or devaluation. Therefore, wage coordination and restraint 
may increase, especially in the traded sector. (See Holden 2003, 2005.)
Posen and Popov Gould (2006) estimate that wage restraint has increased 
in almost all euro area members after the launch of EMU. However, wage 
restraint increased also in Sweden and the United Kingdom in the early 
1990s, suggesting that the eﬀect may be largely due to the increased cred-
ibility of monetary policy, rather than to the creation of EMU per se. Wage 
restraint is also small throughout the period in Germany, where monetary 
policy credibility was strong also before EMU. Thus, if wage restraint de-
pends mostly on the credibility of monetary policy, EMU membership 
would be unlikely to aﬀect wage restraint in Sweden, where Sveriges Riks-
bank currently enjoys strong credibility for its monetary policy.
10.6.4    Political  Inﬂ  uence
One possible cost of staying outside EMU, stressed by the Calmfors Com-
mission, could be the potential loss of political inﬂ  uence within the EU. For 
instance, euro area ﬁ  nance ministers regularly meet with the Eurogroup 
on the day before meetings of the Economic and Financial Aﬀairs Coun-
cil (ECOFIN), and outsiders may fear that many important issues may be 
settled within the Eurogroup before the Council meeting.
Recent research casts some light on this issue. Adler-  Nissen (2008) con-
ducted interviews with Danish and British EU representatives. She reports 
that many Danish representatives felt that being outside EMU constrained 
their possibilities to advance Danish interests within the EU, and that vari-
ous strategies were needed to compensate for this constraint. Other stud-
ies instead suggest that being outside EMU is not a decisive disadvantage 
within the European Council. Lindahl and Naurin (2003) and Naurin (2007) 
conducted interviews with working group representatives in the European 
Council to study the cooperation patterns within the EU. Their results show 
that the most popular cooperation partners were Germany, France, and the 
United Kingdom, with Sweden, the Netherlands, and Denmark following 
closely, in spite of their small weights in the ﬁ  nal voting procedures. Simi-
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interviews with present and former heads of government and top oﬃcials. 
He reports that, again, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom exert the 
greatest inﬂ  uence in Council negotiations. When asked directly, 79 percent 
of the respondents in the study by Lindahl and Naurin (2003) replied that 
diﬀerent countries’ decision to join or stay outside EMU does not matter 
at all for the cooperation pattern. Consequently, while this is not a settled 
issue, the available evidence suggests that there are no strong political dis-
advantages for Sweden of remaining outside EMU.
10.7    Final  Remarks
After the referendum in 2003 and the strong rejection of the euro, the 
question of Swedish membership in EMU disappeared from the political 
agenda. The major political parties agreed that at least two parliamentary 
elections would be needed before the issue could be taken up for serious 
consideration again. Thus, EMU membership is not likely to appear on the 
agenda until after the elections of September 2010.
Ten years after the launch of EMU, the present chapter nevertheless oﬀers 
an analysis of the pros and cons of Swedish membership. The evidence pre-
sented here is not conclusive about whether participation in EMU would 
be beneﬁ  cial or costly for the Swedish economy, but the analysis suggests 
that the consequences of Swedish membership in EMU since the launch in 
1999 would not have been dramatic. To some extent, this result probably 
reﬂ  ects the fact that the last ten years have been a relatively calm period for 
the world economy, without any large disturbances to the Swedish nor to the 
euro area economy. At least this was the case until mid-  2007. The outcome 
of the current ﬁ  nancial crisis could lead to sharper conclusions about the 
potential costs and beneﬁ  ts of EMU.
Sweden came into the crisis in a strong position, with low unemployment 
and solid government ﬁ  nances. The Riksbank has eased monetary policy 
more aggressively than the ECB, leading to lower short-  term interest rates. 
Also, interbank rates have been lower in Sweden than in the euro area. And 
in contrast to many European countries (including EMU member coun-
tries and the Nordic countries), Swedish long-  term bond yields have not 
increased relative to Germany, but are currently lower than in Germany.
The Swedish currency has, however, taken a serious blow, and more so 
than in many other small open economies. Since mid-  2008, the Swedish 
krona has depreciated by around 20 percent against the euro, and by 23 
percent in trade-  weighted terms. Partly this can be explained by the aggres-
sive monetary easing, but much of this weakening seems to be disconnected 
from fundamentals.
The weak exchange rate has led to renewed calls for joining the monetary 
union, and the outcome of the crisis could have important eﬀects on public 
opinion in Sweden vis- à- vis EMU. The Swedish decision in 1994 to become 412    Ulf  Söderström
a member of the European Union was inﬂ  uenced by the deep recession in 
the early 1990s, coupled with a banking crisis and the European exchange 
rate crisis in 1992 and 1993. If the Swedish economy were to suﬀer strong 
adverse eﬀects of the crisis in spite of its apparent strength, then public opin-
ion may well shift and participation in EMU could become reality sooner 
than expected. If, on the other hand, Sweden were to come out of the crisis 
better than the euro area, then Swedish participation in the monetary union 
might be postponed for a long time. In any case, the present study could be 
used as a starting point for a renewed debate on possible membership in the 
third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union.
Appendix
Data Deﬁ  nitions and Sources
GDP: Gross domestic product, constant prices, 2000  100. Source: 
OECD.
Unemployment: Standardized unemployment rate, all persons, seasonally 
adjusted, percent. Source: OECD.
Consumer prices: Euro area: Harmonized index of consumer prices, all 
items, 2000  100. Other countries: Consumer price index, all items, 2000  
100. Source: OECD.
Short-  term interest rate: Euro area: Three-  month EURIBOR; Sweden: 
Ninety-  day treasury bill yield; France: Three-  month PIBOR; Germany: 
Three-  month FIBOR; Italy: Three-  month interbank deposit rate; Spain: 
Three- month interbank loan rate; Denmark: Three- month uncollateralized 
interbank rate; Finland: Three-  month HELIBOR; Norway: Three-  month 
NIBOR; United Kingdom: Three-  month mean LIBID/  LIBOR. All rates 
percent per annum. Source: OECD.
Long-  term interest rate: Ten-  year government bond yield, percent per 
annum. Source: OECD.
Nominal exchange rate: Noon buying rates in New York City for cable 
transfers payable in foreign currencies, quarterly averages of daily data. 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Real exchange rate: Nominal exchange rate deﬂ  ated by consumer price 
index, 1999  100.
Monetary policy rate: Quarterly averages of daily data. Source: European 
Central Bank, Sveriges Riksbank.Reevaluating Swedish Membership in the European Monetary Union    4 1 3
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